In June of 54 BC, the seemingly invincible Roman Republic turned its baleful gaze upon the Parthian-ruled lands of Mesopotamia. The Triumvir Marcus Licinius Crassus, co-ruler of the Roman state and now Pro-Consul of Syria, was preparing a massive army of invasion.


Crassus, the man who decades earlier defeated the gladiator-rebel Spartacus, had grown old and immensely wealthy. Having partnered with Julius Caesar and Pompey Magnus, he was now one of the three virtual co-rulers of the Roman world (see the First Triumvirate). But power and wealth was not enough for the aging Crassus.

crassusA true Roman of his class, he hungered for the kind of military glory that Pompey had earned in his youth, against the Pirates and in the east; and which Caesar was even then winning in Gaul. Following his Consulship in 55 BC, Crassus took Syria as his Pro-Consular governorship. His intent was to emulate Alexander the Great, and at the head of a massive army of legions and auxiliary troops invade the Persia-centered Arsacid Empire of the Parthians!

The Parthians were a conquering race of nomads, of Scythian origin; who, a century earlier, had come off of the Eurasian steppe and seized Persia and Mesopotamia from the decadent and decaying Seleucids, the Graeco-Macedonian dynasty founded by one of Alexander the Great’s generals. The Parthians were still semi-nomadic after a century ruling the heartland of the old Persian Empire; living in tent cities along the Tigris river, and practicing the arts of horse archery and cavalry warfare.

Their very formidable army was composed of masses of unarmored horse Parthian Horse Archerarchers; experts with the powerful re-curve, composite bow. Mounted on swift horses or ponies, these operated in an amorphous mass in battle, weakening and bewildering their opponents with rapid maneuver and showering them with a blizzard of arrows.

The horse-archers were backed by a small cadre of heavily armored nobles, called by the Greek and Roman sources “cataphracts”. Recruited from the Parthian aristocracy, these were much like the Medieval European feudal knights: heavily armored (both man and horse), they were armed with a very long and heavy lance, called a kontos by the sources (meaning “barge pole”).  These were the heaviest cavalry in the ancient world, made possible by the breeding in Persia (beginning with the Medes) of the largest horses known in the ancient world: the eastern Iranian Nisean chargerparthian; perhaps the first “great warhorse” in history. While the largest Roman (or Greek) cavalry horse was a mere 15 hands, these Niseans may have been as large as 18 hands.

Though always a minority of any Parthian army, these cataphracts gave the horse archers a solid force to rally behind when pursued; and gave a Parthian commander a hammer with which to smash an enemy weakened sufficiently by the horse archer’s arrow barrage.

Marcus Crassus brought to Syria a powerful force composed of seven legions (about 35,000  heavy infantry). The reputation of the Roman legions was at their height of fame and prestige. In the previous two centuries they had defeated every enemy: from Hannibal and the Carthaginians to the all-conquering Macedonians; from the Teutonic Germans to Mithradates’ Pontians. Decades earlier, Lucullus and Pompey had faced and defeated with little effort the Armenians armies of King Tigranes; which, like the Parthians, also had a formidable force of cataphract cavalry. Though they had occasionally lost battles, no enemy in two centuries had triumphed for long against the Roman Republic.


Along with the heavy legions, Crassus had brought an additional 4,000 light infantry, and 4,000 supporting cavalry. Among these were 1,000 Gallic noble cavalry. These Gallic horsemen had served Caesar well, and were highly esteemed as heavy cavalry. They had been sent to join Crassus’  along with his eldest son, Publius Crassus; who, after serving with great distinction under Caesar in Gaul, was now reunited with his father.

The Romans did not hold the Parthians in high regard. They had faced horse archers and cataphracts before; and feared neither. The horse archer was only formidable if given a wide plain upon which to maneuver and only so long as his quiver was full. Eventually, his quiver emptied,  he would be forced to withdraw before the relentless march of the undaunted legions. As for the cataphracts, they had been seen in the past to be slow and ponderous; and rapidly attacking Roman infantry had been able to infiltrate their ranks and hamstring their horses.

What the Romans had never faced and were unprepared for was the expert coordination of both these troop-types together; and in the hands of a skilled general who knew both theirs and the Roman’s weaknesses.


Unfortunately for the aging would-be-conqueror,  the Parthians were aware of Crassus’ coming invasion; and their king had placed in commanded just such a general. Known to history as “the Surena” (surely a title rather than his proper name), this otherwise unknown Parthian noble would prove a gifted general and master of cavalry warfare.

As Crassus advanced from Antioch, the Roman capital of Syria, he made his first mistake by ignoring the advice of his Armenian allies to march through their mountainous terrain to the north; and thus avoid the blistering heat of the Mesopotamian plain. Instead, Crassus decided to take the direct route east. Crossing the Euphrates, his army marched through the scorching sun and choking dust to the town of Carrhae; a Greek settlement not far from modern Mosul.

Here he found the Surena waiting to give battle.

The Parthian had but 10,000 men, of which a mere 1,000 were armored cataphracts. With an army a fourth the size of Crassus’, it has been surmised that he was merely expected to reconnoiter and delay Crassus till the Parthian King could muster the main forces of his empire. Whatever his orders, Surena came with a plan for defeating the Romans there-and-now. To this end he had arranged, through Arab guides secretly in his employ, to lead the Romans to a near-waterless plain with ample room for maneuver. To prevent his horse archers running out of arrows during the battle to come, he’d brought a thousand camels; to act as beasts-of-burden, laden with bundles of arrows to resupply his men throughout the battle.

Nor did he ignore the psychological aspects of battle: to demoralize the Romans, he went to great lengths to intimidate them by the incessant beating of great hollow kettle drums; whose deep and throbbing boom unsettled the Romans, unaccustomed to their sound. Surena also had his cataphracts cover their armor in cloths, to disguise their presence till the last possible moment.


The appearance of a Parthian army so soon into the invasion surprised Crassus and caused consternation among his officers. The Romans had  been led to believe (by Surena’s Arab agents, acting as guides) that the Parthian army was yet far away. While his lieutenant, Gaius Cassius Longinus (one of the future assassins of Julius Caesar) suggested a traditional battle deployment and attack, Crassus was (correctly) concerned with being enveloped on the wide plain by the swift-riding Parthians. He therefore deployed his army into a vast, hollow square formation; with each side comprised of twelve cohorts. The cavalry and light troops were deployed within the square of legionaries. While thus protecting his flanks, Crassus had deprived his army of battle frontage and the ability to maneuver.

The Parthians opened the battle with a relentless barrage of arrows. The horse carrahearchers, galloping forward in wedges, loosened their arrows into the Roman ranks. Though the Romans formed testudo,  this usually sound tactic proved ineffective. Coming very close to the Roman ranks, the Parthian’s powerful composite bow pierced shields, pinning hands to scutum; or, falling from the sky, pinned sandaled-feet to the ground. Before the Romans could respond with thrown javelin, the Parthian riders would swiftly wheel their mounts and gallop back the way they had come. While doing so the horsemen continued shooting over the rump of their horses, even as they withdrew. (So the phrase “Parthian shot” came into our own language, meaning any damaging departing blow by word or deed.)

 The Romans, however, continued to advance; and horse archers alone could not stop them. Surena played the next card in his hand. With the unfurling of shimmering banners of multicolored  silk, and accompanied by the thunderous booming of the kettle drums, Surena now ordered his cataphracts, held to that moment in reserve, to throw off the coverings and reveal their polished armor.

The Parthian commander here demonstrated an appreciation of what modern military practice calls “Psi Ops” (Psychological Operations); as the awesome sight of a thousand lancers on massive horses, their armor gleaming in the late afternoon sun, proved demoralizing to the tired and dust-chocked Romans.

For the next hour, Surena’s horse archers continued showering the Romans with arrows; while the presence of the cataphracts, poised to charge, stopped the Roman advance and kept the legionaries from breaking their tight ranks and pursuing the light horsemen.


These tactics, along with the intense desert heart and lack of water, wore the Romans down; morally and physically. By late afternoon, the troops were loosing confidence in themselves and their commander.

Hitherto,  Crassus had waited patiently, confident that in short time the archer’s quivers would empty, and the Parthians would have to withdraw. Unfortunately for the Romans, the Surena’s camels waiting just beyond the battlefield kept the Parthians replenished with fresh sheaths of arrows. Now, as the arrow-storm showed no sign of ending, Crassus began to grow uneasy.

In desperation, he took the advice of his gallant son, Publius; and attempted to drive off the swarms of horse archers by unleashing from within the square a cavalry charge of his Gallic heavy cavalry. Led by Publius, and supported by 500 foot archers and eight cohorts of auxiliary infantry, this mobile strike force charged out, driving the horse archers scurrying away from the Roman main-body.

However, once Publius’ force was beyond the support of the legions, the Parthians turned about, swarming about Publius’ force.  With combined attack of horse archers and armored cataphracts, they beset Publius’ men from all sides. In this fighting, the Roman’s Gallic cavalrymen found themselves at great disadvantage against the cataphracts on their much larger horses. Fighting gallantly, Publius Crassus was slain and his force annihilated.

The Parthians then returned in force to assault Crassus mainbody. This time, they bore before them the head of Publius Crassus, mounted on a lance. The site struck Crassus like a thunderbolt; who was so overcome by emotion that he was incapable of speech.


Now, in conjunction with the ceaseless sting of arrows, the cataphracts assaulted the Romans with a series of pulse-charges; striking home and them pulling back again. This combination of shock-and-missle attack devastated the exhausted and demoralized Romans. Only the fall of night saved Crassus’ army from total defeat that first day. As with all nomadic horse armies, the Parthians were forced by nightfall to withdraw a safe distance from the Romans, to prevent a night attack on their undefended camp and horse-lines.

Deeply distraught at his son’s death, Crassus gave over effective command of the army to his subordinate, Cassius. Cassius, a soldier of some ability and energy, now ordered a night march; and the army retraced its rout back to Carrhae. The Romans managed to put distance between themselves and their Parthian antagonists, gaining Carrhae before dawn. However, the town had insufficient provisions to supply the defeated army. So, assembling after a brief halt, the weary Romans continued their march toward Syria in the morning heat.

Soon, however, galloping messengers from Surena caught up to them; with an offer of parlay. Crassus unwisely granted this request, halting the army and giving the Parthian forces time to catch-up to them.

Crassus and his officers met Surena and the Parthians under an awning.  During the negotiations a scuffle broke out, either planned or accidental; giving the Parthians cause to treacherously attack and murder Crassus and several of his officers.

Nearly leaderless, the army soon disintegrated, with contingents making off as each saw fit. Few survived the desert march back to Syria; though Cassius earned commendation for his skillful handling of the survivors under his command; defeating a Parthian probe the following year into Cilicia.

Many of the legionaries surrendered to the Parthians in return for their lives. The Parthians appreciated the Roman’s fighting quality, and sent the soldiers to garrison their far eastern border. Some years later, some of these Roman slave-soldiers fought with distinction against invading Chinese forces. When their fortress was captured, they surrendered honorably and were taken as mercenaries into Chinese service. They seem to have been settled on the western end of the Great Wall, and genetic testing in recent years has revealed Italian genes among the local Chinese population!

parthian 2

The Surena captured all 7 of the Roman eagle standards; which would remain trophy’s of the Parthian victory at their capital of Ctesiphon-along-the-Tigris (near modern Baghdad), till returned to the Emperor Augustus over half a century later.

Before his death, Julius Caesar was preparing a second invasion of Parthia; to avenge Crassus’ disgrace.  Ironically, it was his murder at the hands of Cassius, the one man to come out of Crassus’ disastrous campaign with any measure of distinction, that prevented the Romans reversing the terrible decision of Carrhae.

Surena, whose brilliant handling of combined arms had enabled the Parthian victory, was rewarded by a jealous monarch with murder. Later Roman armies would win victories against the Parthians, who without a Surena in command were never as formidable as they were that terrible day at Carrhae.


Did you see this supporting story?:


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  1. olikara says:

    Brilliantly written. Two armies fighting under their greatest commanders and the height of their glory.

  2. ethanreilly says:

    Great post! I’ve always been fascinated by the battle of Carrhae – it’s strange, but military disasters are almost as compelling as triumphs.
    Speaking of triumphs, I just finished writing a mammoth post myself about Alexander the Great over at my blog http://ethanreilly.wordpress.com/. Swing by, it’d be great to know what you think.

  3. Bob Holden says:

    According to Polybius, Crassus’ subordinate commanders were so angry at the turn of events they forced him to parlay with Surena under threat of violence. Crassus protested, aware that the Parthian’s real intent was to kill him, which is what happened.

    I don’t quite understand how heavy cavalry of that day count mount a serious impact charge as the saddle and stirrup had yet to be introduced. Which leaves open the question of how the rider managed to hang on. Perhaps the disruption caused by mounted archers was such that any Roman infantry attempting to charge would have lost cohesion. In that case, perhaps all the cataphracts needed to do was run down indivividuals or small groups. Polybius mentions an initial charge at Carrhae against the Roman vanguard, but I suspect the recipients were skirmishers, not heavy infantry. The Parthian cataphracts played an important role keeping the Roman cohorts in check.. But it seems the victory was largely won by their light cavalry and impressive bow..

    Carrhae may have been a disaster for the Romans, but it was a victory for the rest of humanity against a culture which revelled in militarism, cruelty and exploitation of the conquered.

    -Bob Holden

    • barrycjacobsen says:

      Hi, Bob-

      first, Polybius did not write about Crassus; as he lived (and wrote) c. 200 – c. 118 BC. Crassus lived from around 115 BC till killed in 53 BC. You no-doubt meant Plutarch, whose life of Crassus is our primary source.

      Heavy cavalry in the ancient world rode without stirrups; and in some cases without saddle (such as Alexander’s Companion and Thessalian Cavalry). The stirrup doesn’t come along till the 6th century at the earliest; and maybe the 7th. So many modern riders, who can’t imagine not having them wonder how could ancient cavalry have been capable of shock action and melee without stirrups. The answer is: they were. Obviously, they were.

      You are over-thinking this. Don’t worry that the Parthian cataphracts (or any number of other heavy cavalry of the ancient world) couldn’t possibly have done what they did without stirrup (or in cases saddles). They did it! They were VERY effective; and no gimmick, trickery, or excuses to explain that are necessary.

      Stirrups obviously are not that important in combat. As late as the 19th century, Argentine gauchos fought as irregulars and would kick their feet out of their stirrups to give themselves more mobility in saddle. Cheyanne and Lakota warriors fought without saddle or stirrup.

      The Romans improved the performance of their cavalry by creating a four-horn saddle that allowed the rider to brace this thighs against these horns.

    • John says:

      You don’t need a saddle or stirrups to ride… if you look at a horse there’s a nice “groove” between their stomach and front leg. This is where the rider places his leg and holds on!.

      • barrycjacobsen says:

        Quite right, John. Which is why the history of effective cavalry predates stirrups by 1500 years.

  4. I wonder how many arrows 1,000 camels can carry?

    • barrycjacobsen says:

      Sounds like a great question a TV documentary on History could answer. You know, “Disaster in the Desert”, the story of Carrhae. I can see the show’s host (Mike Loades) and his team of researchers posing that very question; then putting it to the test, with the help of some locals and their camel!

  5. Michael Kerr says:

    John Peddie in his book The Roman War Machine writes that each camel could carry a load of some 180 lb. On that basis if the Parthians used 1 oz arrows that amount to 3000 arrows per camel, but that would be reduced if the arrows were supplied with quivers as well for easy re-distribution to returning horsemen so mathematically with 1000 camels the total number of arrows would number between possibly 2-3 million arrows for 9000 horse archers.

  6. Kian says:

    بسیار زیبا بود. ایران به کسانی‌ چون سورنا همچنان نیاز دارد.

    • barrycjacobsen says:

      نه، به عنوان یکی از وارثان رم، ما آمریکایی ها قطعا سورنا یکی دیگر از نیاز نیروهای پیشرو ایرانی نیست!

      • Kian says:

        I think Iran today is in a situation similar to Roman time and need some people like Surena to stop western expansion into Iran and middle east.

  7. barrycjacobsen says:

    We of course disagree.

  8. melosa says:

    thanks for this – i am currently reading plutarch’s life of crassus with my kids 10 & 12 – this will be a huge help when we get to the final battle – appreciate your work!

  9. Baggers. says:

    Just stumbled across this item. Excellent writing and a great account of one a fascinating aspect of ancient military history, thanks.

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