In 1628, the Hapsburg dream of a united, Catholic Germany ruled from Vienna seemed nearly realized. From Bohemia to Denmark the Catholic-Imperialist forces had crushed all opposition, in a decade of war. The Protestant Electors of the Rhine principalities had been humbled, the Czechs brought back into the Catholic fold, and Denmark defeated and humiliated. By 1630, the Imperial armies of Tilly and Wallenstein were camped along the Baltic shores, with Germany seemingly pacified behind them, and only Protestant Sweden across the icy waters still defiant.
However, the “Lion of the North” was an enemy of no little ability.
Scion of the warrior Vasa dynasty, Gustav II Adolf was the most brilliant offshoot of a family tree known to produce soldiers and statesmen of exception. Coming to the throne in 1611 at the age of 16, he inherited three wars from his father: against Denmark (the Kalmar War), Russia, and against Poland. The first was concluded by treaty in 1613; and the second ended in 1617 with the Treaty of Stolbovo, which excluded Russia from the Baltic Sea. The Polish war dragged on till 1629, ending with the Truce of Altmark, which transferred the large province Livonia to Sweden.
Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden
These conflicts early in his life not only greatly enhanced the territory and power of the Swedish Empire, which now controlled the eastern Baltic; but honed Gustavus’ native abilities as a commander. In Poland he faced a very good commander in his own right; the great Hetman of the Polish Commonwealth, Stanisław Koniecpolski. Much of the talent he showed later for rapid and unexpected maneuvers may have been learned fighting against this Polish hero; whose hallmark this was. Gustavus also no doubt used the Polish war to develop his tactical theories and to train his small, professional army into a finely tuned machine.
In June of 1630 Gustavus landed in Pomerania; where Sweden already had a base at Stralsund. The Swedish king set about methodically taking fortresses and towns. Many surrendered upon a show of force; the northern Germans inclined to support any Protestant champion. The Swedish expeditionary force was financed, in large part, by French money: the far-sighted Cardinal Richelieu preferring a continuation of the religious war in Germany to a Germany united under Hapsburg domination on France’s doorstep. Gustavus was also aided by the Emperor’s dismissal of Wallenstein earlier that year, after that great Imperial commander’s failure to capture Stralsund following a prolonged siege. While the bulk of Wallenstein’s army joined Tilly’s, many thousands of veteran mercenaries abandoned Imperial service in disgust, and took service under the Swedish king.
In the next year, the Swedes were too weak to offer battle against Tilly’s superior army; and negotiations for alliance with timid Protestant princes unwilling to brave the wrath of Tilly’s Imperial army seemed to be going nowhere. Then Protestant Magdeburg was captured and sacked by Tilly’s army in May 1631; in an act of barbarity so savage it shocked the sensibilities of Catholic and Protestant alike. Of the 30,000 citizens, only 5,000 survived the orgy of rapine and murder by the Imperial army. For the subsequent fourteen days, burned and mangled bodies were carried to the Elbe River, which became choked with the dead. The Imperial cavalry commander, the Graf zu Pappenheim, wrote:
It is certain that no more terrible work and divine punishment has been seen since the destruction of Jerusalem. All of our soldiers became rich. God was with us.
When Tilly moved into Saxony, pillaging far and wide to feed his ravaging host, the Elector was finally moved to throw his lot in with the Swedes. Gustavas marched on Leipzig, which Tilly’s army had just captured with enormous booty. Reinforced by the Saxon army of 18,000 he now had, along with his own 23,000 Swedes (one Brigade of which was composed of Scots) an army of 41,000. The Swedish lion was ready to give battle a few miles northwest of Leipzig, on the plain of Breitenfeld.
Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly, the seventy-two-year-old Walloon general commanding the Imperial army, had learned his trade in the Low Countries under the famed Duke of Parma. He was an accomplished commander, and had defeated every enemy who’d dared face him in battle. Though outnumbered in the coming battle, he was confident his 35,000 men were the equal of any number the Protestants could raise against them!
As veteran as he himself, Tilly’s Imperial army had campaigned for 10 years from the Bohemian Alps to the Baltic. Trained in the Spanish model, the heart of his army was the Imperial tercios: massed blocks of pike-and-musket armed units. Like moving fortresses, these ponderous squares varied between 3,000 and 1,500 men each, drawn-up in up to 30 ranks. Tilly had seventeen tercios deployed at Breitenfeld; about 25,000 trained and experienced infantry.
(Above) Imperial/Spanish tercio, detail from contemporary illustration. (Below) Breakdown of pike vs “shot”
By contrast, Gustavus’ reforms of the Swedish army had created a much different fighting force. Disdaining the ponderous tactics of the tercio, and building upon the work of Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus’ infantry were organized into regiments and Brigades, the latter of 1,500 men. Unlike the Imperial tercio, the Swedes deployed in 4-5 ranks deep; each brigade formed in a cross-shaped formation of pike and supporting musketeers. In battle, these formed-up in two lines; the brigades of the second line supporting the gaps between each brigade in the first. The Swedish system allowed the units to maneuver more rapidly on the field, and to deliver a much higher rate of fire against the enemy.
In numbers and quality of infantry the Imperial forces had the advantage, particularly in quality. Tilly deployed about 25,000 veteran infantry to the Gustavus’ 15,000 Swedes. Though Gustavus’ Swedish Brigades were of excellent quality; the 9,000 Saxon allied infantry were poor quality militia, armed and trained in outdated pike tactics and with few muskets. Tilly had little to fear from these.
17th century pikeman, set to receive a charge
In the 17th century, infantry were the solid core of an army, the pike-blocks providing moving fortresses that dominated the field. But cavalry were the decisive arm in battle, maneuvering on the flanks and in the gaps; the hammer to the tercio’s anvil. Cavalry were a large and effective part of both armies at Breitenfeld.
17th century musketeer
There were of three types of horse during this age in Western Europe: cuirassiers, harquebusiers, and light horse.
The first of these, the cuirassiers, were the supreme heavy cavalry of the day. These were horsemen equipped in three-quarter plate armor (including a cuirass that was proof against firearms) and armed with sword and pistol. They were trained to charge the enemy, the first two ranks discharging their pistols at close quarters before drawing their swords and galloping into the enemy’s ranks. Sweden, poor in resources and lacking large horses, fielded only one regiment of these in the war. The Imperials, on the other hand, had the services of many thousands of such cuirassiers, commanded by Pappenheim; who due to the color of their armor were called “Black Cuirassiers”.
The second type was a hybrid medium cavalry, the archetype for the dragoons of the following century. Though equipped and trained with a harquebus to skirmish with the enemy, mounted or dismounted; they were also quite capable of charging with sword, and many regiments equipped their troopers with a cuirass and helmet.
Finally, the Imperial army had a number of Croat and Hungarian light horse. These were skilled scouts and foragers (the Croats in particular earning a fearsome reputation as plunderers), and in battle could harass the enemy’s flanks or ruthlessly pursue a broken foe. Their counterpart in the Swedish forces was provided by Finns, commanded by Gustav Horn; excellent scouts, foragers, and nearly as feared in battle as the Croats. These were known as Hakkapeliitta, there name based on their battle cry hakkaa päälle (“Cut them down!”).
In pure numbers, Tilly’s Imperial cavalry were outnumbered by their Protestant opponents: 9,000 to Gustavus’ 13,000. But the allied cavalry were more lightly equipped, and none were as heavily armed (and armored) as Pappenheim’s feared Black Cuirassiers. Worse for the Swedish king, 5,000 of Gustavus horsemen were Protestant German contingents of doubtful quality.
In Poland, a land of superb cavalry, Gustavus had resorted to the Huguenot practice (from the French Wars of Religion) in the previous century, of detailing small units of musketeers to support the cavalry with fire. These “”commanded shot” gave the otherwise over-matched Swedish horse a fighting chance at breaking the charge of better mounted and equipped Polish lancers. This practice continued in Gustavus’ German campaigns; and would play a key part in the coming battle at Breitenfeld.
Only in number and quality of guns was the Imperial army at a disadvantage. Larger but less mobile than those of the Swedes, they were set-up in battle before the infantry line. Once placed they were difficult to move, and so usually stayed in one place throughout the battle. The Swedes and their Saxon allies had as many heavy guns, but Gustavus, a great proponent of artillery, had reformed that arm; standardizing the calibers in use and lightening the guns themselves. The Swedish guns were thus easier to maneuver and faster to load. Additionally, each of the Swedish Brigades had their own integral light artillery, in the form of some six light 3 pounder “regimental guns” per Brigade. These were easy to manhandle in battle, and could sustain a relatively rapid rate of fire. Finally, Gustavus had cross-trained his cavalry and infantry as gunners; so that in a pinch they could man guns whose crews were slain in battle, or turn against their previous owners enemy guns overrun and captured.
Swedish regimental 3lb gun
THE ARMIES DEPLOY
On a bright and hot morning, September 17 1631, Tilly drew up his 35,000 Imperial troops along some two miles of frontage, deployed in two lines; with a small cavalry reserve. In the Spanish custom, he posted his cavalry on both wings; his stolid tercios in the center, with the artillery spread evenly across the front. A gentle slope favored his dispositions, and the day would begin with the sun at his back and in the eyes of his Protestant foes. The Imperial forces were resplendent in the costume of the day; the imperial colors of red and yellow predominating in what passed for uniforms, beneath buff coats and steel cuirasses.
The Imperial left was commanded by the renown Count von Pappenheim, whose “Black Cuirassiers” were considered the best heavy cavalry in western Europe. Pappenheim had seven full cuirassier regiments attached to his wing (by contrast, the entire Swedish army had but a handful of companies of fully armored cuirassiers). On the opposite flank, the Count Egon von Fürstenberg commanded another five cuirassier regiments; supported by a regiment of dragoons and one of Croat light horse. Fürstenberg also had a large number of heavy guns supporting his wing; which would play a large part in the battle against Gustavus’ Saxon allies.
By contrast, the arrival of Gustavus allied army must have presented a much meaner appearance. In tattered blue and brown homespun, after months of sleeping in plowed fields, the Swedes presented a rustic site compared to their splendid counterparts.
Swedish musketeers and pikemen, life-sized diorama at Swedish Armeemuseum, Stockholm
In full view of their foe, Gustavus drew up his Swedes in two lines and a reserve; with the Saxon allies on their left. The king deployed his Brigades in a chessboard fashion, those of the second line covering gaps equal to their frontage between those of the first. The front line composed of four Brigades, the second of three. Across their front were twelve heavy guns in one grand battery (as well as the 24 regimental guns of the four infantry Brigades). The guns were commanded by young Lennart Torstensson; a gifted artillery prodigy who, one day, would prove his own worth as an army commander. The infantry of the center were commanded by Maximilian Teuffel, a German soldier in Swedish service.
On the Swedish right were 4,100 horse supported by 1,200 “commanded” musketeers; commanded by the veteran Johan Banér. The Swedish left comprised 2,300 cavalry supported by 800 musketeers; and commanded by Gustavus’ second-in-command, Count Gustav Horn.
Beyond Horn’s cavalry wing and facing Fürstenberg was the Saxon army, under the nominal command of their Elector, John George; assisted by a professional German soldier-of-fortune, Hans Georg von Arnim. The Saxon deployed their blocks of pikemen into a wedge formation, supported on either wing by massive wedges of cavalry. Such a formation can only be of use in the offense; and it is evident that Gustavus, who planned to let the Imperial army break itself against the superior Swedish firepower, was not on the same page as his ally.
THE BATTLE OF BREITENFIELD
The battle began with the Imperial screen of Croat light horse attempting to interfere with the Swedish deployment. They were thwarted when Banner unleashed the shaggy Finnish Hakkapeliitta upon them. The Finns gave the Croats the kind of savaging they were used to dealing out; and the Croats scattered back to their own lines. Satisfied with themselves, no doubt, the Finns fell back through the gaps in the Brigades and rejoined the reserve.
Over the next two hours, the artillery exchanged fire. The Swedes’ better trained gun crews fired three-to-five times faster than their opponents; and soon got the better of the exchange. In response, Tilly ordered his the cavalry on both flanks to attack.*
On Tilly’s left, the fiery Pappenheim led some 5,000 of his Black Cuirassiers in a furious charge on the Swedish right-wing horse, under Banér. Expecting to crush the lighter Swedish horse (even the “heavy” regiments had little more than a simple cuirass worn over a buff coat), Pappenheim’s squadrons received an unexpectedly stout reception: disciplined volleys by the Swedish “commanded” musketeers supporting the Swedish horse; followed by short, determined charges by Banér’s squadrons. Attempts to swing wide and outflank the Swedish line were met by squadrons and companies of the second Swedish line, who, drilled to meet just such a move, coolly wheeled to meet the Imperialists.
Seven times that afternoon Pappenheim, the scarred veteran of countless charges, reordered his squadrons and flung them once again against the ill-mounted, contemptible Swedish horse and those impudent musketeers operating between their squadrons. Each time these darted out, deployed, and fired a deadly hail of lead into his massed squadrons. Into the resulting confusion, the Swedish horsemen counterattacked, and then fell back to reform. Each time Pappenheim’s dwindling regiments pulled back, frustrated and bloodied.
Meanwhile, on the Imperial right, Fürstenberg’s cuirassiers enjoyed a very different outcome against Gustavus’ Saxon allies. Supported by heavy cannonade, the Imperial cavalry charged the inexperienced and poorly led Saxons that formed the left of the allied line. Deployed for attack and not defense, the Saxons were ill-prepared to receive this assault, which proved too much for the Saxon militiamen.Despite their officers best efforts to steady them, they dropped their weapons and fled the field in utter rout! With the blades and pistols of Fürstenberg’s riders in their backs, the 18,000 strong Saxon army quitted the field in mass.
At a stroke, Gustavus was deprived of forty-five percent of his army; and his left-wing exposed. Tilly saw his opportunity, and ordered his infantry to advance to their right at the oblique, in an effort to take advantage of the situation and outflank the Swedes.
Fortunately for the Protestant cause, Fürstenberg needed time to reorder his squadrons; and a tercio, like an elephant, had great mass but little spring. As they ponderously advanced into the void left by the Saxon rout, Gustavus’ intrepid second-in-command, Gustav Horn, had time to order a response.
Acting coolly and quickly, Horn ordered the Swedish second line of foot and horse (which included General John Hepburn’s Green Brigade of Scotsmen) at right angle to their main line; facing and covering the exposed left. As Tilly’s infantry came up and began to wheel to their left, they were brought under fire by regimental guns and some heavy guns of Torstennson’s main battery. Worse for Tilly, their redeployment was further slowed when Horn counter-attacked Fürstenberg’s horsemen, who’d attempted an ineffectual spoiler attack against Horn’s redeploying reserves; and were thrown back into their own advancing tercios, causing disorder and delay.
At 6pm, the battle reached its climax on the Swedish right. Following the repulse of Pappenheim’s seventh assault, Gustavus took personal command of the squadrons on his right. Aware of the rout of the Saxons and the crises on his other flank, it was time to put-paid to Pappenheim and free his right from interference. At the head of his savage Finnish Hakkapeliitta he led the counter-attacked in mass against the retreating Imperials. Repulse turned to rout, and Pappenheim’s famed Black Cuirassiers were stampeded from the field. They did not stop riding till they reached Halle, fifteen miles to the northwest.
The oblique advance of Tilly’s infantry to their right had left his main artillery batteries, which were stationary and unable to maneuver with the infantry, all but deserted in the center of the field. With his Hakkapeliitta in hand, Gustavus rode across his own front to overrun Tilly’s guns, and scattered the small body of Imperial reserve cavalry. Simultaneously, the unoccupied Swedish center began wheeling forward to their left; as the whole battle was changing face 90 degrees.
Now the cross-training of every Swedish soldier as a gunner paid dividends; as the Swedish horsemen turned Tillys guns against the left flank of the tercios, where they delivered a withering enfilade fire against their erstwhile owners. Torstennson’s main battery, no longer occupied with counter-battery fire against the Imperialist guns, now joined in smashing the tightly packed ranks of the Imperial infantry.
Even the best of soldiers can only endure so much. As casualties mounted, the Imperial infantry closed ever-shrinking ranks and began to look to their rear. At that moment, Gustavus delivered the coup-de-grace, attacking simultaneously with cavalry and foot from his right; as Horn led a charge of his cavalry around the right of tercios. Facing envelopment, and the threat of having all retreat cut off, the Imperial army broke.
The Swedish cavalry were not inclined to mercy, and in close pursuit rode among the fleeing masses inflicting with cold steel “Magdeburg quarter”. Only growing darkness and the presence of a deep wood to the rear of the battle put an end to the pursuit and gave the Imperial survivors a place of succor.
Tilly, thrice wounded during the fighting and unconscious, was carried from the field by a small escort.
The battlefield was a charnel house, with perhaps as many as 12,000 dead or dying on the field. 7,000 had grounded arms and surrendered, most of which (being mercenaries) took service with the victor. Of the allied Swedish-Saxon army, some 5,000 were casualties; the majority of which were Saxon (by some accounts, the Swedes loss a mere 200 men).
Capturing the Imperial camp intact, the Swedish forces found it well-victualled, and Gustavus celebrated with his army a titanic victory at Tilly’s expense; dinning and drinking from Imperial stores.
When news of Breitenfeld reached Vienna, the Imperial court was “struck dumb”. This was the first victory in battle by Protestant forces since the 30 Years War had begun in 1618. Throughout the Protestant world, there was rejoicing with a fervor that knew no bounds. At last, a champion had appeared, in the form of the “Lion of the North”, and a hopeless cause had been restored.
In Halle, Tilly could only rally 600 foot. Pappenheim joined him, with a mere 1,400 horse remaining under the Imperial banner. Worse news soon followed, when word came that Gustavus’ forces had overrun Merseburg, and after a brief skirmish forced the surrender of another 3,000 Imperial troops. The battle was a disaster for the Catholic cause, and the Imperial army had overnight ceased to exist.
Breitenfeld was that rare thing: a decisive battle. It utterly changed the tide of a war that had seemed all but over, following 13 uninterrupted years of Catholic-Imperial victory. Though the 30 Years War would drag on for another 17 years, claiming the lives of both Gustavus and Tilly (and, ultimately, Tilly’s successor, Wallenstein) and countless others; soldiers and civilians alike. But after Breitenfield, the cause of Protestantism in Germany was never close to extinction.
Ultimately, Breitenfeld accomplished that, the succor of the Protestant movement in Germany; and one other thing. It prevented an early unification of that country under Hapsburg rule. It would take another two-and-a-half centuries and the genius of Otto Von Bismarck to accomplish that task.
Militarily, Gustavus ushered in the era of linear formations and firepower as the decisive factor in battle. His infantry, fighting in lines of fewer ranks and greater frontage allowed less to cover more; and to deliver more fire to greater effect. Though the pike would continue in use among infantry till the early 18th century, the ratio of pike-to-shot would continue to shift towards firearms; till the invention of the bayonet allowed every infantryman to be both pikeman and musketeer.
In artillery, as well, Gustavus was both visionary and revolutionary. He was the first to make good use of light, mobile field guns in battle; and in the future all European powers would experiment with and develop this arm. Eventually it would lead to mobile horse gun batteries, and more and greater field artillery in every army. Before Gustavus, artillerymen were military contractors, hired by generals and princes for each campaign. After Gustavus, they were all military professionals, a branch of every nation’s armed forces.
Breitenfeld solidified Gustavus Adolphus’ reputation as a commander. Though he lost his life a mere fourteen months later at Luetzen, he would forever be rated by such experts on the subject as Napoleon and Clausewitz, as one of history’s greatest commanders.
*Some scholars of the battle say Pappenheim’s assaults on the Swedish right were impetuous and launched either without Tilly’s sanction or at least prematurely. That Tilly meant to wait on the defensive till reinforcements joined him. Scholars to this day puzzle over what Tilly planned; but as neither Tilly nor his lieutenants penned an account of the battle, we can only speculate. Some have suggested the old Walloon soldier planned an audacious double envelopment maneuver; using his qualitatively superior cavalry to break both wings of his enemy’s forces; while their center was pinned in place by the mass of his infantry, and the artillery of both sides still pounding away at each other. This may well be the case: Pappenheim’s massive heavy cavalry attack initially on the Swedish right-wing cavalry is reminiscent of Hannibal’s opening gambit at the Battle of Cannae. There, the Carthaginian heavy cavalry led by Maharbal thundered against the Roman left wing horse; shattering them and sending them fleeing from the field. But Gustavus was no Varro (the ill-fated Roman commander at that ancient debacle); and he had an effective counter to Pappenheim’s impetuous assaults.